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This paper"  assesses  the significance  of sanctions  against  employers  of
i1'lega1  aliens for resource  a'rocation and  income  distribution  in the
United  States.  A model  is developed  to identify  the characteristics of
industries I  ikely to be monitored  most  intensively by the jmmigration
authorities.  Data  from  the 19g0  Census  of popuiat]on  are then used  to
measure  these  characteristics for U.s. industries.  Having  determined  wh.ich
industries make  the best targets for  inspection,  an incidence  analysis  is
carried out under  alternat.ive  assumptions  about  the overa.l  I  level of
enforcement. Estimates  are made  of the effects of sanctions  on aggregate
U.S. production,  the real wages  of native low- and  high_ski.l  I  labor. and
the size of the il legal al  jen work  force.THE  INCIDENCE  OF  SANCTIONS  AGAINST  U.S. EMPTOYERS  OF  ILLEGAL  ALIENS
After years of debate,  the U.S. Congness  jn 19g6  gave  its  f.ina)
approval  to an immigration  bill  that rad.ical  ly alters the nature  of U.S.
immigration  1aws.1 The  cornerstones  of the bill  are amnesty  prov.i  sions for
i'l  1ega1  aliens who  have  resided  continuously  in the Un.ited  States  since
1982  and  sanctions,  or penalties, for employers  who  continue  to hire
'i  'l 
1ega1  alien workers. The  principal objectives  of the legislation are to
extend  to those  aliens with a long history of U.S. residency  the full  array
of privileges and  opportunities  available to other citizens, but to
othefwise  limit  or reduce  the a'l  ien population  by discouraging  employers
from  offering jobs to i11ega1  workers,
The  purpose  of this pape|i s to examine  the economic  consequences  of
the employer  sanctions  feature of the new  immigration  bi11.  Specifically,
we  wish Lo assess  the potential significance  of the sanctions  program  for
production  and  wages  in the U.S. economy.  Our  basic approach  is to view
sanct'ions  as a tax on the use  of illegal  immigrant  labor by employers
targeted  for  inspection  by the immigration  authorities.  The  penalties  are
'levied 
on a per alien basis.2  Therefore,  if  employers  know  the pattern of
enforcement,  are risk neutral, and  have  no ethical or moral  reservations
about  disobeying  the 1aw,  they will  respond  to sanctions  as they would  a
tax levied at a rate equal  to the fine tjmes  the probability of detection.
In many  respects,  our analysis  of employer  sanct.ions  follows the
standard  theory of factor tax incidence. There  is one  additional layer of
compl  ication,  however. It  i  s not immediately  apparent  which  industries
face high effective tax rates and  which  industries face low rates.  The taw-z-
c0ntains  no statutory provisjons  regarding  the pattern of enforcement. It
is  left  up to the immigration  authorities to decide  \4hich  industries to
nonitor and  with what  intensity.3  unfortunately!  there are no public
records  of employer  raids carrjed out under  the old immigration  law.  Nor
are there any  plans  to document  future inspections.  Thus,  the industry
pattern of enforcement  must  be inferred using ind.irect  methods.
We  assume  that the immignatjon  authorities allocate their  I  im.ited
'inspectf  on resources  in a way  that maximizes  the number  of detected
violations.  In this  framework  there are two  characterist.ics  that are
important  in determining  whether  a given industry  wjll  be  monitored:  the
number  of  i'l  1egal  aliens working  at an individuar bus.iness  establishment
and  the ratio  of illegal  to total  workers  employed  by f  ir-ms  in the
industry.  Data  from  the l9g0 census  of population  are used  to assess  each
of these  characteristics for U.S. jndustr.ies  thought  to employ  large
numbers  of i ilegal al.ien  workers.
Having  determined  wh.ich  industries make  the best targets for
inspection,  we  carry out an incidence  analysis  using  alternative
assumptions  about  the overall level of enforcernent.  For  any  given ievel of
enforcement,  a group  of industries is selected  for  inspection.  lvlonitorinq
in that sectoli s assumed  to be sufficiently  intensjve  to achjeve  a
complete  displacement  of illegal  workers. Monitoring  in the remaining
sector, on the olhen  hand,  is assumed  Lo be negligible.  Higher  levels of
enforcement  are considered  by adding  to the list  of .industries  tarqeted  for
inspectjon.-3-
Incidence  calculatjons  are performed  using  a general  equilibrium  model
similar to those  commonly  used  in studies  of partial  factor taxes.4
Estimates  ane  made  of the effects of empioyer  sanctions  on aggregate  U.S.
production,  the neal wages  of native I  o\./-  and  high-ski11  labor, and  the
size of the iliegai  a'l  ien work  force.
The  paper  is organized  as follows.  Sectjon  I  provides  a simple  model
of the enforcement  pattern chosen  by the immigration  authorities.
Industries I  ikely to neceive  the most  frequent  inspection  are identified.
section II  reviews  the basic theory  of how  employer  sanctions  wirr affect
u.S' labon  markets- sect.ion  III  then provides  a nume.icar  analysis  of the
range  of effects that sanctions  could  have  on resource  allocation and
income  distribution  in the united states.  The  pr'i  ncipal conclusions  of t.he
arti cl  e are summari  zed i  n Secti  on IV.
I.  Industry Enforcement  Patterns
Given  the sheer  size of the U.S. economy,  it  is unlikely that lne
immigration  authorities will  receive  resources  sufficient  to completely
eliminate illegal  alien workers  from  the economy.  Th.i  s is the case  in
other countries, where  large numbers  of illegais  remain  after the
.  introduction of sanctions.5 The  cost of monitoring  increases  rapidly as
'  more  and  more  employers  are brought  under  surveijlance.  And  because
itlegal  immigration  is a controversial issue, widespread  support  for a
large enforcement  budget  is djfficult  to obtain.6-4-
Given  a limited budget,  the jmmignation  authoflities  must  formulate  an
enforcement  strategy.  One  strategy  could be to be unpredictable.
Uncertainty  about  the probabil  ity  of detection, even  if  low, can  serve  as a
7
deterrent.'  However,  experience,  as well as the plans  of immigration  and
Natural  ization Service  as reported  in testimony  before  Congress,  suggests
that the authorities wjll  not behave  unpredictably.8 Law  enforcement
agencies,  from  the Internal Revenue  Servjce  to the local police, display a
strong  tendency  toward  pred.ictable  emphasis  on specific targets.
A. A model  of enforcement
we  will  assume  that the industry pattern of enforcement  is derived  from
a stac  k1  ebu  rg-  type game  between  employers  and  the immigration  authoriLies.
Employers  take as given  their chances  of being  inspected. They  are risk
neutral and  react to sanctjons  as they would  a tax levied at a rate equal
to the fine times  the probability of detect.jon. The  immigration
authorities seek  to maximize  the number  of detected  violations subject  to a
fixed enforcement  budget.  In doing so, they are assumed  to Know,  and  to
take into account'  the economic  adjustments  that firms wi11  make  in
response  to different frequencies  of inspection.
To  develop  this problem  formally, let  vi denote  the fractjon of all
establ  i shments  in industry ito  be inspected  (i=1  ,...,M).  The  v- wil.l be
the choice  variables  of Lhe  authorities.  The  number  of violations detected
in  industry i  can  be expressed  as a.,vrN' where  aj  is the number  of .i  1.1  egal
aliens working  at an individual establishment  and  N. is the total  number  of
establishments  in the inoustrv.-5-
Inspections  under  the new  law take the form  of an audjt of employee
records.  The  cost of inspecting  a single establ  ishment  is written as the
sum  of a fixed component,  denoted  kO,  and  a variab.le  component,  which  js
assumed  to be proportional  to the total  number  of employees  in the
establishment. The  variable component  is expressed  as kr(arlbr),  where  b.
denotes  the ratio of illegai  workers  to total  workers  in industry i.  The
constraint faced  by the authorities is that the sum  of all  inspection  costs
not exceed  a fjxed budget  R.
With this  notation, we  can  write the enforcement  problem  of the
i  mmi  gration authorities as




subject  to  E v.N.  fk^+k,  (a./b.  )l  = R I  t-  u  t.  l
i
0 < v- < 1  i = 1,...,14.
Industries are distjnguished  by Lhree  variables: the number  of illegal
workers  per establishment  (ar),  the ratio of i11ega1  to total  workers  (br),
and  the number  of estabrishments  in the industry (Ni).  The  immigration
authorities know  noL  onry the initiar  varues  of these  variables, but arso
how  each  will  respond  to djfferent vaiues  of v..  An jncrease  jn v- is
equivalent  to an jncrease  jn,the rate of tax on illegal  1abor.  It  is
reasonable  then to expect  a{ .  0, bi < 0, and  ti.  O.
The  Kuhn-Tucker  conditions  for the enforcement  problem  are-6-
(2)  vi(azlavi) > 0, (1-v,)(aZ/au,)  < 0, and
0 < v' s 1  j = i,...,tl
where  a7/av.  = a.iN,o1,(0'i-u)  - a,v,Nro;.t(_Ni/Ni)(oi_u)  +
(-ai/  a,)oi  (  t-uk1bi'  ) + (-b{/bi  )0.i  ur<rup,  }.
In writing  aZ/avi, we  have  used  the symbol  O',  as shorthand  for the
expression  [(  kO/a,  )+(  krlb,  )J-1.  In general  , Oi represents  the average
number  of violations detected  per doilar  spent  inspecting  estabrishments  in
industry i.  l,,ihen  eval  uated  at ui = 0,d.i  also gives the number  of
detections  made  possible  from  the fjrst  dollar  spent  inspecting  the
i  ndustry.
The  term  u in (2) is the Lagrange  multiplier  that js associated  with
the budget  constraint.  It  serves  to parLition all  industries into those
that will  be and  those  that wir  not be monitored. Industries receivrng
some  measure  of surveillance  are those  with a value  of O- that, when
evaluated  at vi = 0, is greater  than p.9  Two  factors determine  the initial
size of dr--the initial  number  of illegal  workers  per establ  ishment  and  the
initial  ratio of i11ega1  to total  workers.  The  1arge.i s either term, the
more  ljkeiy  it  js that the industry  will  be rnonjtored.
For industries  with establ  jshments  that face a probability of
inspection  that is posjtive, but less than one, v- is given  by
(3)  vi = (o.i-u)  + {(-Ni/Ni)(0',-u)  * (-aila',)0,(t-ukrb1,)
+  (-6//t-,  l,r, ,,t  h-t1-7-
Eq.(3) identifies five  industry characteri  stics that jointly  determine  the
optimal frequency  of inspection.  Two  of these--a. and  b---measure  the
intensity with which  i11ega1  alien workers  are used  by individual
establ  j  shments  in rhe industry.  The  other three__(_a{/a-  ),  (_bilbi  ),  and
(  -  N  ;  /  N  i  )  -  -  i  n  d  i  c  a  t  e how  sens  i  ti ve the key i  ndustry  vari  ab  re  s are to changes
in i  nspecti  on frequenci  es.
It  can  be shown  from  eq.(3) that optjmal  v, varies directly with both
a. and  b.,.  The  reason  for this  is that, when  evaluated  at a common  vi,  the
increase  in detected  violations result.ing  from  an incremental  change  in
fnspection  expenditures  is highest  for  industries  with establishments  that
employ  a large absolute  number  of illegal  workers  or a high ratio of
i11ega1  to total  workers. Thus,  it  is optimal  to inspect  these  industries
lvith relatively  great frequency. on the other hand,  detections  are row  at
the margin  for  industries that display a large percenrage  response  in
either ai,  b-,  or N.,  to increased  frequencies  of inspection.  Surveillance
in these  'industrjes  wiII  tend to be Iess thorough.
B. Estimates  of targeted  industries
In establishing  which  u.s.  industries are rikely to be monitored  most
intensively by the immignation  authorities, we  concentrate  on two  of rhe
industry characteristics jdentifjed as being  jmportant  in the previous
section: the initial  number  of illegal  alien workers  per business
establishment  and  the initiar  ratio of i11ega1  to total workers  empl0yed  in
the industry.  Estimates  of these  characteristics are developed  by-8-
combi  ni  ng exi  st  ing research  on the si  ze of the i.l  l  egal
with oun  own  analysj  s of the industry  distribution  of
worKers.
aiien population
i  11ega1  immigrant
l'luch  valuable  information  on the illegal  alien population  has  been
.btained from  Lhe  1980  census  of population. Anaiysis  indicates  thar the
i11ega1  population  is  1arge,  but not as rarge  as many  had  craimed  durinE
the mid  1970's.  Census  Bureau  research  places  the number  of i11ega1  aliens
in the country  in 1g86  between  3 and  5?  million.l0  This range  is based  on
a count  of the jllegals  represented  in the 19g0  Census  together  with an
estimate  of the rate of i11ega1  immigration  during the 19g0's.  The  annuar
flow estimate  was  derived  from  a 1993  survey!  whire the rate of illegal
immigration  from  Mexico  is thought  to have  risen sharpiy  in recent  years
with the dete.ioration in the Mexican  economy.  Nevertheress,  after
adjusting for a possible  downward  bias in the Census  figures, it  seems
reasonable  to use  6 milrion as an uppef  bound  for the size of the ilreqar
alien popu'lation  in 1986.
To estimate  the indusrry  distribution  of illegar workers,  we  obtained
information  from  the Pubiic-use  sarnple  of the 19g0  census  on the industry
locations of emp)oyed  individuals  who  were  born  outside  the united states
and  whose  ability  to speak  English  was  poor.  Not  al]  of the individuals in
this group  were  illegal  al  iens.  Nor  was  the Census  Bureau  ab.le  to
interview all  i11ega1s,  despite  a special effort  to obtain information  on
noncjtizens.  However,  becauge  the two  groups  have  similar skills  and
handicaps'  thei.industry  emproyment  di  stributions shourd  be simi  r  ar.  ll-J-
Because  of special  provisions  jn the new  imm.igration  law to meet  the
seasonal  needs  of agriculture, we  considered  only nonagricultural
industnies  when  preparing  our iist  of targeted  industries.  Due  to
limitations of sample  size, we  arso excruded  any  industry estimated  to have
employed  'less 
than 3/4 of one  percent  of the illegal  labor force.  This
'left 
us with the 30 industries shown  in Tabre  1.  Together  these  industries
accounted  for 73 percent  of .il1ega1  nonfarm  emproymenr,.
The  first  column  in Table  I  shows  how  iliegal  alien workers  are
di  stributed across  U.s. industries.  of all  the irlegals engaged  in nonfarm
employment,  48 per-cent  ane in manufacturing  and  3g percent  are in
service-producing  industries (not shown). The  four largesl empioyers  are
appare'l  manufacturing,  restaurants,  construction,  and  food  processing.
It  is not necessarily  the industrjes that emproy  large absolute  numbers
of i11ega1  aliens that wi  |r  draw  the mosL  attention from  the .immigration
authorities, however. Surveillance  is more  likely  to be focused  on
industries with a large number  of i11ega1  workers  at an indiv.iduar
establ  ishment  or a iarge ratio of illegal  to total wonkers. Estimates  of
these  industry characteristics are shovrn  in the second  and  third columns  of
Table  1.  To  obtain these  figures, we  first  computed  t.he  number  of illegai
aliens employed  in each  industry by multiplying the frequencies  in the
first  column  by an estimate  of the totar number  of i11ega1  aliens working
in nonagricultural  industries during 19g6.12 The  absorute  employment
figures were  then standardized  using  dat,a  on number  of business
establ  i  shments  and  total  worKers.-lu-
First  note the w'ide  range  obtained  for  the number  of illegai  workers
per establishment. For example,  there are more  than l5 i11ega1s  per
establi  shment  in footwear,  apparel,  and  food processing. Resraurants  and
construction,  on the other hand,  average  no  more  than 1il1ega1 worker  per
estab.l  ishment. The  disparity in these  numbers  has  two important
implications: that enforcement  of sanctions  will  not be uniform  across
jndustries and  that it  will  prove  increasingly  expensive  for the
authoriljes to monitor  additional employers.
The  figures in the tabre also revear  that manufacturing  industries are
predominant  among  industries  with a large number  of illegals  at the
individual establ  ishment. 0f the 21 industries having  an average  of 2 or
more  illegal  workers  per establishment,  only 4 are not fn manufacturing.
Thus,  to the extent that enforcement  is mone  thorough  on large employers,
illegals  in manufacturing  will  be displaced  more  extens.ively  than illegals
in other sectors  of the economy,  such  as construction  and  services.
Industries  with a large number  of aliens per estabrishment  also tend  to
use  a high ratio of illegal  to total  workers.  Th.i  s can  be seen  by
comparing  the figures in the second  column  wiLh  those  in the third  column.
The  simple  correlation coefficient between  the t\'o sets of figures is  .77.
41  ternatively,  of the 15 industries with largest number  of aliens per
establishment,  9 are in the gnoup  of fifteen with the 
'largest 
ratios of
i11ega1  to total  workers. And  of the 6 who  are not in thjs  latter  group,
oniy hospitals stand  out as having  an exceptionaily  1ow  ratio of i)1egar to
total  workers. 0ur assessment  of these  results is that,  jf  the object of
the analysis is to determine  the effects of sanctions  on the qeneral  level-  11-
of production  and  wages  in the economy,
exclusively  on the number  of aliens per
used  to group  industries into those  that
moni  tored under  altel"native  enforcement
then l  i  tt le i  s l  ost by focusi  ng
establ  i  shment  as the characteri  stic
will  and  those  that will  not be
reg  ime  s  .
IL  Labor  Market  Adjustments
Sanctions  against  employers  of i11ega)  workers  act as a tax on the use
of illegal  immigrant  labor by industries targeled  for  inspecLion  by the
immigration  autho'ites.  A detai  led incidence  analysis .i  s provided  in the
next section.  Here  we  review  the basic allocative effects of the policy
and  set out the parameters  that are cruciar in evaruaLing  its  effectiveness
jn reducing  the supply  of iliegal  workers  and  raising the wages  of
compet  ing l  abor  groups.
The  primary  impact  of employer  sanctions  is on the market,  fo.immigrant
'labor. 
Figure  1 shows  how  the policy is  1ike1y  to affect the wages  of
i11ega1  workers  and  the location of their employment.  There  are two
sectors  in the domestic  economy.  sector  A consists  of  industries subject
t0 inspection  by immigration  officiars.  sector B is comprised  of ar  other
jndustries, nith enforcement  in these  industries considered  negl.igible.
The  left  panel  in the figure shows  the supply  of iliegal  workers  and  the
demand  for these  workers  from  industries .i  n sector  B.  These  relationships
are used  to derive the excess  supply  schedule  shown  in the right panel  .
The  market  for  illegal  immigrant  Iabor is  in equ'i  ribrium  when  the excess
suppiy  from  sector  B equais  the demand  from  .industries  in sector  A.-12-
The  effect of sanctions  is to reduce  the demand  for  i11ega1  rabor in
sector  A.  Thjs drives down  the net jmmigrant  wage  from  w to wr.  Given  the
expected  penalty, the cost of illegal  labor is sti11 higher  for industries
in sector  A.  As  a result,  (il-I,q,)  workers  are displaced.  (I-I')  of these
Y/ithdraw  from  the nationar  market.  The  remaining  (IB,-IB)  find emp'loyment
in sector B.
From  a public policy v.iewpoint,  it.i  s the flow of workers  between
sectors  of the national economy  that  is particularly  noteworthy. Not all
of those  displaced  from  the enforced  sector  end  up leaving  the country.
The  immigration  policy then  appears  more  effective than iL real1y is.  The
single-market  model  outlined above  can  be used  to uncover  the economic
parameters  that bear  crucjally  on the way  the displaced  workers  are
a  I  I  ocated  between  countries.
(4) d  I,/dIA  = n,/(n-rrer)
Eq.(4) expresses  the number  of i11ega)  workers  ieaving  the national rabor
market  as a fr-action  of the total  number  of workers  displaced  from  the
enforced  sector.  The  value  of dI,rdIO  is  seen  to depend  upon  three
parameters:  the elasticity  of supply  of i11ega1  labor (r1),  !he share  of
il legal workers  empioyed  in the unenforced  sector (rr),  and  the elasticity
of demand  for  i)1egal labo.in  the unenforced  sector (co).  The  direction
of influence  each  parameter  has  on the sorution is  stra;ghtforward. The
more  responsive  is the supply  of immigrant  labor to a decline in wages,  the
greater the share  of the displaced  workers  who  withdraw  from  the national-i3-
labon  market.  0n the other hand,  if  a large fraction of i1.l  egal workers
are employed  in the unenforced  sector and  the capacity  of that sector to
absorb  additional workers  is high, as measured  by a large elasticity  of
demand,  then a greater number  of the workers  who  leave  the enforced  sector
find jobs in the unenforced  sector.
In additjon to their effect on immigrant  labor supply,  there is
considerable  interest in the v{ay  empioyer  sanclions  will  affect the wages
of competirig  labor groups. As shown  by Ethier (19g6), the results depend
greatly upon  whether  employers  can  dist.inguish  between  1ega1  and  illegal
workers. l,ie  assume  that 1ega1  and  i11ega1  workers  are costlessiy
distinguished,  This means  that the wages  of iegal workers  will  only be
altered through  normal  channels  of input substitution.
To keep  things simple,  consider  a model  in which  there are only two
markets:  the market  foli  11ega1  workers  and  a market  for a competing  group
of lega1  workers,  referred to as low-skill  labor.  As before, treat the
sanctions  program  as a tax on the use  of i11ega1  workens  by industries in
sector  A.  Then  the sancLions  again  serve  to rajse the cost of ii.legal
labor for firms in the enforced  sector  and  to lower  the cost of i11ega1
labor for all  other employers. l{hether  the wage  of 1ega1,  low-skil.l
workers  rises or fal1s depends  upon  what  happens  to the aggregate  demand
for  I  ow-ski  I  I 
'labor. 
suppose  the tv/o  i  abor  groups  are subst.i  tutes.  Fi  rms
in the enforced  sector are encouraged  to use  more  regar  workers. But firms
in the unenforced  sector have  the opposite  incentive.  Depending  upon  the
relative strengths  of the two  effects, the row-ski11  wage  may  either rise
or fall.The  tension  in the low-skill  labor
of comparative  statics.  The  solution
assuming  that demand  elasticjties  are
low-skill  labor is.i n fixed supply.
market  can  be resolved  with the aid
given  below  has  been  simpl  i  fied by
the same  across  sectors  and  that
dw,'zdt  = e,-r[w,_,2(1+t)][rro(n-e11)  + l.IAeII]+
[-e,_a(n-e11)  -'LITIL]
In the above  equation,  wi denotes  the vrage  of labor group  i,  ,,t,,  the
effective rate of tax on illegal  labor, I.k  the fr-action  of labor group  i
employed  in sector k, and  e-- the elasticity  of demand  for facton iwith
respect  to the price of factor j.  The  subscripts  I and  L refer to illegal
and  low-skill  labor, respectively.  Market  stability  requ.ires  that the
denominator  jn eq.(5) be positive.  The  direct.ion  of change  in the
low-skil1 wage  then hinges  on the sign of the numerator. The  degree  of
substjtutability  between  illegal  and  1ega1  1abor,  err,  clearly plays an
important  role 'in  the solution.  The  remaining  terms  indicate that the
low-skill  wage  is more  likely  to rise the larger is the elastic.ity of
supply  of i11ega1  labor and  the larger is the enforced  sector,s share  of
low-skill  labolin  relation to.its  share  of .i  Ileqal labor.
III.  Incidence  Analysi  s
The  purpose  of this  section is to provide  a numerical  analysis  of the
effects of employer  sanctions  on resource  al  location and  income-  15-
distrjbution  in the Unjted  States,  The  analysis is based  on a simple
general  equilibrium  model  simiiar to the one  that has  been  used  to study,
among  other things, the incidence  of the corporate  income  tax IHarberger
(1962)], the distributional consequences  of unionism  [Johnson  and
Mieszkowski  (1970)], and  the general  trends in American  earnings  during  the
t!./entieth  century  [lrlillianrson  and  Lindert (1990)].
A. The  mode  I
The  general  model  contains  two sectors  of production.  Sector  A
consists  of all  sanctionable  industries.  sector B conpri  ses  all  other
nonagricultural  industries, with enforcement  there considered  negl  igibie.
Each  sector employs  four factors of production:  illegai  immigrant  workers
(I),  native low-skjll  labor (L),  narive high-skill  labor (H), and  capital
(K).  Production  in each  sector is governed  by constant  returns to scare,
and  all  markets  are competitive.  Incidence  'i  s determined  by treaLing the
sanctions  program  as a partial  tax 
'levied 
on the use  of i11ega1  labor by
fi rms  in sector  A.
We  follow Jones  (1965)  in choosing  notat.ion  and
of the equilibrium  conditions.  The  equations  shown
linearizing the system  about  the initiaj  undistorted
the mathemati  cal form
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The  equations  of the model  are expressed  in rates of change,  with a ,,,r
over  a variable denoting  a percentage  change. The  endogenous  var.iables  are
the outputs  of the two sectors  (denoted  xk with k=A,B),  the four factor
rewards  (denoted  w, with j=I,L,H,K), and  the price of good  A.  All
financial variables  are def  .j  ned  in terms  of good  B which  serves  as a
numeraire. There  are three sets of elasticity  parameters:  the compensated
eiasticity  of demand  for product  A (o),  the wage  elasticity  of  supply  of
i11ega)  immigrant  labor (1),  and  the output-constant  e'lasticity of demand
jn sector k for  factor i  'd.ith  respect  to the price of factor .i (rf.r).  ffre
remaining  notation is as for'r  ows:  trl. is  the fraction of facto.i  absorbed
by sector k, SrO  the di  str.ibutive share  awarded  to factor j  in sector k, c
.  the share  of aggregate  consumption  accounted  for by products  .in  secLor  A,
and  "t'r lhe effective tax rate expressed  as a percent  of the.i  n.jtial
'i  l  l  egal wage.
Eq'(6) is the equirib.ium  condition for product  market  A.  The  eouation-17  -
gives the change  in relative product  prices requjred  to adjust demand  in
the face of changes  in product.ion  jn sector  A.  Ignored  are any  changes  in
real income  that may  contlibute to a shjft  jn the demand  for product  A.13
Eqs.(7)-(9) are full  employment  condjtions  for the three labor markets.
The  left-hand side of each  equation  details the nelative change  in the
economy-\{ide  demand  for the particuiar labor gr-oup. The  change  in iabor
demand  in a given sector  consists  of an output  effect (equa1  to the
relative change  in production)  and  a sum  of facton substitution effects
(each  expressed  as the product  of a demand  elasticity  and  the relative
change  in the cost of the factor).  The  right-hand  side of each  equation
gives the change  in the relevant labor supply.  In the case  of i1)egal
al  iens, labon  supply  responds  directly  to changes  in the real wage. The
supplies  of native  workers,  on the other hand,  are assumed  fixed.
The  supply  of capilal is assumed  to be perfectly elastic w.jth  respecL
to real earnings. This allows  for the possibility  of outflows  of capital
in response  to reductions  in the suppiy  of immignant  rabor.  The  elasticity
condition is  imposed  1n  eq.(10)  where  the real return to capital is held
constant.
Eqs.(11)-(12)  require  that d  i  s  t  r  i  b  u  t  i  v  e  -  s  h  a  r  e wei  ghted  sums  of the
relative changes  in factor prices equal  the relative changes  in product
prjces.  These  conditions  follow from  the assumpt.ions  that markets  are
competitive  and  that production  techniques  are chosen  to min.imize  unit
costs.
B. Data  and  parameter  values-  18-
An appendix  offers a complete  discussion  of all  the .informat.ion  needed
to solve the equations  of the model  .  Here  we  focus  on two sets of
parameters:  the elastjcity  of immigrant  supply  and  the elast.icities of
factor substitution.  These  parameters  are especial.ly  crucia.j  in gauging
the extent to which  employer  sanctions  achieve  their  expected  results.
Elasticity  of immjgrant  supp'ly. In their  survey  article,  Krugman  and
Bhagwati  (1976)  conclude  that elasticities  of migration  with respect  to
destination  earnings  generally  lie  between  0.5 and  2.0.  This range  is
consi  stent with the results of Greenwood  and  McDowe.l  I  (lgg2) who  fjnd a
wage  elasticity  of reported  emigration  from  llexico  to the united states of
1,.4. Gjven  that our model  ignores  the downward  pressure  on foreign wages
that woujd  accompany  immigration  reform,  whatever  elasLicity is chosen
should  be adjusted  downward.  In our base  case  s.imulations,  we  use  a value
of 1.0 for the elasticity  of i11ega1  immigrant  supply.
that figure so prominently  in eqs. (7)-(9) refrect the extent of technicar
substitution possible  among  factors of production.  Indeed,  for  i  I j,  e  !(_.
is simply  €.,.o-h..  where  L  ;c+i.irv  ^f  c,,hcri+,,+.i^- J^ rJ  o-^.  denotes  the Allen elasticity  of substitution
between  factors i  and  j.  Given  the adding-up  condition -l .!.'.  = 0, it  is
tJ
clear that each  ei.  can  also be expressed  in te)"ms  of the o',l  .  Thus,  to
evaluate  the elasticities  of factor demand  we  require estimates  of
elasticitres  of factor subslitution for al  l pairs of factors.
There  is a substantial  econometric  riterature on factor substitution
among  labor of different  skirl  types  and  of these  rabor types  for capitar.
Elasticities  of factor substitution.  The  elasticities  of factor demandUsing  information  provided  in a survey  by Hamermesh  and  Grant  (1979),  we
were  able to assign  values  to the elasticities  of substitution betlreen
native low-ski11  labor, native high-skill  1abor,  and  capital.
Nevertheless,  there are two  deficjent aneas  in the literature.  Fjrst,
estimates  of substitution elasLicities are generally  not ava.i  lable by
detai  led industry.  Therefore,  the chosen  estimates  were  assumed  to apply
to all  sectors  of the economy.  Second,  there are no measures  of the
technical substitution possible  between  i11ega1  immigrants  and  other
factors.  The  procedure  used  to evaluate  these  parameters  is as follows-
In our study, skill  classes  are defjned  by educational  attainment. The
low-skill  labor force consists  of all  workers  who  failed to complete  high
school  .  In terms  of education,  then, illegal  immigrants  are very sim.ilaf
to native low-skill wonkers- For  this  reason  we  assume  that the
substitution possib)e  between  each  of these  labor groups  and  high-ski1l
'labor 
or physical  capital is the same,  i.e.,  that oIH  = oLH  and  oIK = 6LK.
This leaves  us  with or,_,  the elasticity  of substitution between  illegal  and
native low-skill  labor.  Because  of differences  in Engiish  proficiency, the
two groups  are generaily  not perfect substitutes.  But they are 1.i  kely to
be highly substitulable  w.ith  respect  to other job skill  attributes.
Given  values  for oIH, dIK, and  the distribut.ive shares  of all  factors,
oIL can  be un.iquely  determined  from  information  on rJI,  the output-constant
own-price  elasticity  of demand  for  il legal labor.14  Ii  is this
relationship that we  exploit in eva'l  uating  orr.  Econometric  studies
'indicate  that the elasticity  of demand  for 1ow-wage  labor is around  _1.0
Isee  Zucker  (1973)  and  Cotte.i  '] 
I  (1975)1. Since  ii'lega1  immigrant  labor-20-
constitutes a subset  of all  Iow-wage  labor, the demand  for  i11ega1  alien
workers  is probably  somewhat  more  elastic.  In our base  case  simulations,
we  assume  a value  of -1.5 for c,,  which, in turn,  .implies  a value  of 11.g
for ora.  This provides  for a high degree  of substitutab.i  lity  between
il1ega1  and  1ega1  low-skill  labor.  A more  moderate  value  for o*  is
considered  in a sensitjvity  exercise.
50 that the reader  may  have  a better feer for the data, Tabie  z shows
all  of the information  used  to solve  eqs.(6)-(12)  for the inrermediate
enforcement  regime. In reviewing  the data, first  note  the reratively sma11
values  foli  11egai  laborrs distributive  shares. Despite  a generous
assessment  of lheir  numbers,  i11ega1  workers  constitute only a small  part
of the tota'l resources  in the uniLed  states economy.  This implies  that the
effects of sanctions  on aggregate  output  wjll  be small.  And  except  for
cases  where  factors are highly substitutable  for  i11ega1  1abor,  it  also
means  that changes  in the cost of iliegal  labor will  have  only moderate
effects on the earnings  of other factors.
Also noteworthy  is the fact that  industries in the enforced  sector
employ  a higher ratio of illegal  to legai low-skill  labor than  do
industries in the unenforced  sector.  This is  indicated  by the inequality
IIA t  tLA.  As shown  through  eq.(S), thjs  condition serves  to moderate  the
rise  in the low-skill wage  that occurs  in response  to employer  sanct.ions.
So, while a pattern of selective enforcement  may  constitute an efficient
use  of inspecLion  resources  and  be optimal  with regard  to achieving
reductions  in the illegal  working  populat.ion,  it  tends  to underm.ine
whatever  success  sanctions  may  have  .in  raising the living  standards  of
compet  i  ng native workers.-4t-
C. Resuits  for different  levels of enforcement
Tabie  3 reports simulation  results for three enforcement  regimes- In a
"LOW"  enforcement  regime,  monitolj  ng is assumed  to be I  im.ited  to the
industries in Table  I  that emp'ioy  an average  of g or more  illegal  aliens
per business  estabrishment.  This group  of industries initiarly  account:,
for 33 percent  of all  illegals  empioyed  in nonfarm  occupations. In a
"l4EDIUMrr  regime,  enforcement  is extended  to industries with at least 2
i  11egai  s per establ  i  shment. Together  these  .i  ndustries  absorb  49 percent  of
the illegals.  Fjnally,  .i  n a ',HIGHr  enforcement  regime,  all  of the
industries in Tabre  r are assumed  to be sanctionabre. These  industries
initiaily  account  for 73 percent  of the nonfarm  illegal  work  force.
In each  enforcement  regime,  surveillance  is assumed  to be sufficientry
thorough  to el  iminate  al  l  i  11ega1  workers  from  the enforced  sector.  The
tax rates shown  in Tabre  3 are the impricit rates required  to ach.ieve  this
result.  Each  rate is expressed  as a percent  of the initia)  illegal  wage.
Ir/hen  enforcement  is  rrLOl{,,,  sanctions  have  very smal.l  effects on
production  and  wages. A weighted  average  of the changes  in sectoraj
outputs  shows  only a 0.5-percent  decline in gross  domestjc  product.  The
real low-skil1 wage  rises--a resurt that is expected  and  desired  by most
supporters  of immigration  reform--but  it  rises only  2.7 percent. Also
smalI  are the costs of sanctions  on faitors that are not crose  substitutes
for  i11ega1  workers'  In our moder,  it  is high-skir  rabor  that bears  the
cost of immigration  reform  in the long run.  Resurts  not reported  indicate-  aL-
that a portion of this  burden  wourd  arso fa  on cap'itar  were  it  no! for an
external market  for capital.
One  of the reasons  for the small size of these  effects js that iliegal
alien workers  account  for a small share  of total  value  added. Another  is
the fact that,  in the ,,LOW'r  enforcement  regime,  sanctions  reduce  the supply
of i11ega1  workers  by only 16 percent.  Even  though  33 percent  of illegal
nonfarm  workens  are originally  employed  in sanct.ionable  industries, only
one-half  of lhese  withdraw  from  the u.s. 
'l 
abor  market.  The  other half frno
work  in  industries of the economy  where  enforcement  is weak. This does  not
mean  that it  would  be more  efficient  for the immigration  authorities to
deploy  their  limited resources  inspecting  all  establ  i  shments  with equal
frequency. But when  coverage  is not complete,  the sanctions  will  appear
more  effective than they rea11y  are.
If  enforcement  is  "lvlEDIUM'r  , sanctions  have  a larger, but.  still  moderat.e
effect on the economy.  It  is only when  enforcement  is  "HIGHn  that the
sancti  on  s produce  si  gni  fi cant resul  ts.  In thi  s case,  the nonfarm  i  1 
.lega1
work  force is  r-educed  by 52 percent  and  the rea'l low-skill  wage  r.i  ses  by 9
percent.  0f course,  a greater adminjstratjve  effort  is required  to achieve
these  results.  To see  what  is  invoived,  suppose  that the probability of
detection  can  be represented  by the ratio of total  inspections  to total
number  of estab'l  ishments  in the enforced  sector.  Then,  for any  enforcement
regime  i,  the effective tax rate expressed  as a percent  of the init.ial
illegal  wage  rate is given  by ti  = (frlw)(ErlNr),  where  f', is the fine per
detected  violation,  E. the inspect.ion  budget,  and  N. the number  of
establ  ishments  in the enforced  sector.  By  making  use  of this  relationshrp,
we  can  compare  the enforcement  efforts  .impl.icit  in any  two regimes.-23-
(  13) (  fl,/f0)(ErlEo)  = (  t1lt0)  (Nt/N0)
Table  3 provides  information  on implic.it tax rates and  number  of
establ  i  shments  for each  of the enforcement  regimes, when  this  information
is  inserted into eq.(13), we  reach  a stnikjng conclusion:  to move  from
"LOW'r  to "HIGHrr  enforcement,  and  to thereby  achieve  a 5Z-percent  rather
than L6-percent  reducLi  on i  n the i  I  1ega1  worki  ng  popu.lat.jon,  requi  res
either a 23-fold increase  in the fine,  a 23-ford increase  in the number  of
worksite inspections,  or sone  combination  of the two.  These  calculations
somewhat  overstate  the incremental  cost of achieving  broader  compl  iance.
Large  establ  ishments  take more  staff time to inspect  than  do sma11  ones,
and  large establishments  are most  prevalent  among  industries in the 'rLOW,,
regjme. Nevertheless,  it  is clear that the marginal  cost of enforcement
rises sharply  with the fraction of the i11ega1  labor force to be removed
from  the domestic  economy.
D. Sensitivity experiments
rnere  are two  parameters  which  are crucial lo the success  of a
sanctions  program  but which,  at the same  time, are especially  difficult  to
evaluate.  These  are the elasticity  of .immigrant  supply  and  the elasticity
of substitution between  iilega) and  1ega1  low-skill 
'rabor. 
Tabre  4 reports
the results of sensitivity experiments  performed  using  alternative varues
for these  panameters  i  n the case  where  enf  orcement  i  s 'rlr1EDIUf,.l',  .  To  make-24-
the comparisons  meaningful,  we  have  used  the base-case  tax
sensitivjty experiment. This ensures  that the enforcement
same  in all  cases.
rate in each
budget  is the
The  figures in the fjrst  t\,/o  columns  show  the effects of reducing  the
elasticity  of immigrant  suppiy  from  1.0 to 0.5.  The  most  noteable
difference between  the two sets of numbers  is a significant drop in the
extent to which  illegal  workers  are induced  to leave  the u.S. labor market.
cons'idering  that our original assessment  of the immigranL  supply  erasticity
was  generously  hiqh, it. is quiLe  possible  that reductions  .in  the il)ega1
working  population  will  prove  even  more  difficult  to achieve  than  our
earl.i  en results i  ndi  cated.
As previously  noted,  the elasticity  of substitut.ion  between  i11ega1  ano
1ega1  1ow-skill labor is derived  from  a value  assumed  for the
output-constant  elasticity  of demand  for i11ega)  1abor.  In our initial
simulations,  we  assumed  a value  of -i.5  for e'  which  in turn implied  a
value  of 11.8  for orr.  This provided  for a high degree  of substitutabiljty
between  i11ega1  and  lega1  low-skill  labor.  In the third column  of rable 4
we  show  what  happens  when  the demand  elasticity  is reduced  to -1.0 and  the
correspondi  nq val  ue for oI  fal  l  s to 3,5.  llii  th substi  tutj on between  the
two labor groups  more  limited, the benefits of immigration  reform  to nat.rve
low-skil  l workers  are greatry reduced. The  rear row-ski11  wage  rises by
only one-fourth  the amount  it  did in rhe base  case.  It  arso  becomes  more
expensive  to gain compl  iance  within the enforced  sector.  This illustrates
the bas'ic  principle of tax theory  that the more  inelast.ic  is demand,  the
larger is the tax needed  to ach.ieve  a given  quantjty reduction.-25-
IV. Conclusions
with more  than 4 mirion  business  estabr  ishments  subject  to sanctions
under  the new  immigration  law, .it is un1.i  kely that enforcement  will  be
sufficiently  complete  to eliminate illegal  aliens from  the u.s. labor
fonce.  A more  likely  outcome  is that the .imm  jgration authorities will
focus  their  enforcement  efforts on industries with a large concentration  of
i)1ega1s  at an individual establishment. Information  presented  in this
article  indicates that manufacturjng  industries are predominant  among  large
empl  oyers  of i I  l  egai a  l  i  ens.  Thus,  the contract.i  onary  effects of
immigration  reform  are 1ike1y  to be felt  most  stnongly  in manufacturing.
0ther sectons,  such  as services  and  construction,  which  emoioy  illegais
with a low concentration  at the estabrishment  leve1, are iikery to face
weak  enforcement  and  to absorb  significant numbers  of displaced  aliens.
simulation results for cases  of incomplete  enforcement  indicate that as
many  as one-half of the workers  displaced  from  the enforced  sector  may  ftnd
employment  in other parts of the U.S. economy.
The  incidence  of emp'loyer  sanctions  will  be uneven  across  factor groups
as well as industries.  The  principar beneficiaries  wiI  be native  workers
in  low-skill  occupations. Improvements  in their  living  standards  are nor
1ike1y  to be 1arge,  however. Our  numerical  results suggest  that even  if
enforcement  is vigorous  enough  to reduce  the nonfarm  i11ega1  population  by
one-ha1f,  the average  real wages  of native  workers  with less than four
years  of high school  will  rise by less than ten percent.  The  costs  of-26-
immigration  reform  will  be borne  primarily by hiqh-ski1l workers. But lne
percentage  reduction  in thejr wages  will  be even  more  mooerate.
Through  the course  of the analysis, a number  of difficult  choices  had
to be made  regarding  certain key  parameter  values  and  basic issues  of
modeling. In the interest of conservati  sm,  these  choices  generally  were
made  in a way  that enhances  the poss.ibility of the legis)ation achieving
expected  results.  For example,  we  assumed  that employers  could  easily
distinguish between  )ega1  and  iilegal  workers. This ensured  thal
reductions  in the illegai  labor force would  bring aoout  some  tmpnovement  in
the iiving  standards  of competing  native  workers. However,  strong
opposition  to sanctions  has  been  voiced  by Hispanics  who  are concerned  thaL
the law  will  lead to racial discrimjnation  in hiring.  This pressure  may
lead to an enforcement  strategy  that is  ress serective  and  efficient.  It
may  also cause  the immigration  authorities and  the courts to be lenient on
employers  who  hire i11ega1s  bearing  counterfeit documents.  Developments
along  either of these  I  ines wou'ld  make  sanctions  less effective.
Nevertheless,  given  the nature  of our findings (i.e.,  that sign.i  ficant
reductions  in the illegal  labor force w'i  1i be expensive  to obtain and  thac
any increases  in the general  rever  of wages  of row-skir  native wonkers
will  be modest),  the fact that our assumptions  were  conservative  only
senves  to strengthen  the basic thrust of the conclus.ions.-27-
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Footnotes
'I
'For a summar-y  of the new  immigration  bill,  see  U.S. Congress,  House
Committee  on the Judiciary (19g6).
ZTh"  lu" contains  a graduated  penalty system. First-time offenses
carry a $250  to $2,000  fine for each  i11ega1  immigrant  hired.  By  the th.i  rd
offense, the fines can  reach  as high as S10,000  per alien.  Employers
convicted  of a pattern or practice of violations can  also receive  a
s  j  x-mo  nth pri  son  term.
? 'Enforcemen! 
re  s  p  o  n  s  i  b  i  1  i  t  i  e  s are di  vided  between  the Department  of
Labor  and  the ImmigraLion  and  Natural  ization Servjce.
t'See  l"lcLure  (1975)  for a survey  of the use  of general  equil  ibr-ium
models  in lax incidence  analysis.
q
"See  U.S.  General  Accounting  Office (1995)  for a compilatjon  of
commentaries  on the effectiveness  of laws  that govern  the emp.l  oyment  of
alien workers  in Hong  Kong,  Canada,  and  several  European  na!jons.
'For an anaiysis  of how  the opposing  positions of busjness  and
organized  labor have  been  reconci'led  io produce  sma11  budgets  for border
enforcement,  see  Shughart,  Tol  I  i  son, and  Kimenyi  (19g6).- JL-
1 'This principle  is noted  by Spicer  (19g6)  in his analysis  of tax
evasion. Also see  Calvo  and  Wellisz (197g)  for a discussjon  of the
efficiency of discontinuous  and  unpredictable  monitor'i  ng  to dfscourage
sh  i  rki  ng among  employees.
SINS  Corrissioner  Nelson  testified  that plans  for enforcing  employer
sanctions  involved  targeting specific employers  for  intensive  mon.ito.ing.
See  A.C. Nelson,  trstatement  by A1  an C. Nelson,  Commisioner,  Immigration  and
Natural  ization Service,rr  in u.s. congress,  House  committee  on the Judiciary
(  1e83).
'To see  this,  evaluate  aZ/av  i  at v.=0.  The  result.ing  expression  will
be positive if  and  only jf  d. is greater  than  U.
1n '"See  Passel  (i986).  For a general  summary  of the I  iterature on
estimat'j  ng the size of the j11ega1  alien population,  see  Slater (19g6).
11S""  Peu"."  and  Gunther  (1985)  for further ev.idence  supporting  the use
of the Census  group  as a proxy  fon i11ega1  immigranrs.
--The  nonfarm  i11ega1  work  force was  assumed  to be 4 million.  This
figure was  derived  by assuming  a total  population  of 6 mill.ion  and  then
making  allowances  for those  working  in agriculture and  those  not work.i  ng  at
al  I ._33  _
"If  sector  A consists  primarily of tradeable  goods  jndustries, as it
does  here, the relevant income  concept  is real world income. Idorld  jncome
will  fall  if  employer  sanctions  serve  to interrupt an .rnternational  labor
m0vement  that is welfare-promoting. But deady/eight  losses  such  as these
typically  prove  small in calculation.
1A '-The 
theoreticaj relationship i s given  by
oIL  = (1/01)[-err-(srorr+0*o16)J
where  g. is the aggregate  share  of faclor i.-24 -
Appendix:  Initial  Equil  ibrium  Data  and  parameter  Values
This section further detairs the sources  of data used  in the numerical
simulations.
Employment  shares. The  sectoral distributions of employment  were
obtained  from  information  in the pubric-use  Sampre  of the 1gg0  census  of
Population. The  employment  distribution  for  illegal  aliens was  estimated
from  data on the industry location of workers  who  were  born  outside  the
United  States, spoke  English  poor'ly  or not at all,  and  spoke  a language
other than Engiish  in the home. The  employment  d.istribution  of natjve
low-skilI workers  was  derived  from  data on working  individuals  who  were  not
in the illegal  proxy  group  and  had  faijed to complete  high school  .  Native
high-ski1l workens  were  those  not in the proxy  group  with at.l east a
high-school  education.
Distributive shares. The  computation  of d.j  stributive shares  is
cornplicated  by a paucity of data on val  ue-added  for nonmanufacturing
industnies.  For each  sector, we  assumed  that laborrs aggregate  share  was
equal  to 0.6, the ratio of total  employee  compensation  to GNp. Values  for
the jndividual labor shares  were  derived  by combining  information  on
employment  shares  wit.h  data on the size of the three labor groups  and  therr
relative wages. As noted  in section I,  the current nonagricultural  work
force of i1'lega1  al  iens  was  assumed  to be 4 mil  lion.  The  numbers  of
low-ski  1i and  high-ski  l r workers  were'taken  from  r9g6  BLS  data.  The  wage
rate of i11ega1  alien workers  was  assumed  to equal  that of native low-skilI
worKers. As suggested  by data in the 19g0  Census,  the high_ski.l  1 wage  was
taken  !o be 30 percent  higher  than the low-sk.i  l1 wage.-35-
Elasticities  of factof substitutjon.  In selecting  values  fo" oLH,  oLK,
and  ot*,  we  concentnated  on studies  that had  derived  their  estimates  from
cost functions rather than production  functions (as noted  by Hamermesh  and
Grant  (1979,  p.520), estimates  of A  en erasticit.ies of substitution
computed  from  panameters  of a production  function tend to have  )arge
standard  errors).  The  general  results fron these  studies  are that
high-skill  labor and  physical  capiral are each  substirutabie  for low-sk.i  ll
1abor,  and  that high-skill  labor is  less substitutable  for capital than is
'low-skil 
I  labor'.  The  parameter  values  shown  in Table  2 are consistent  w.rth
these  results and  are .i  ndjcative of the magnjtudes  of the estjmated
elasticities.
0ther parameters.  0ur select.ion  of the elasticity  of immigrant  supp.ty
was  discussed  in section  III.  The  compensated  erasticity  of demand  for
products  from  the enforced  sector  was  assumed  to be 1.0.  The  moderaLely
high value for this parameter  reflects the predominance  of manufacturing
industries in the enforced  sector.  Because  of an absence  of detai.l  ed
consumption  data, the parameter  a.  used  to compute  changes  in real wages  was
measured  by the percent  of total  nonagricultural  employment  accounted  for

































































































-Tabl  e I
ILLEGAL  ALIEN  WORKERS  IN U.S. INDUSTRIES
ercent  o
il l  egal al  iens
i  n nonagri  cul  tural
Iliegal
al  iens per
establ  ishment2
ega
al  iens per
hundred
workers  3 Indust I  ovment  r
Canned  fo  ods
Leather & footwea  r
Apparei
Computers
Fleat  p  rod  uct  s
Grai  n & bakery  products
lnansport  equipment
Texti  I  e  s
Primary  metal  s
Hospita)s
Furn  i  tu  re & fixtures
El  ectri  ca  I machinery
Paper  & ai  l  ied products
Mi  sc. manufacturi  ng
Chem  i  ca  i  s
Rubber  & plastics
Beverages  & mi  sc. foods
Department  stores
Fabri  cated  meta'l  s
Educational  institutions
Hotels  & motels
Services  to dwel  I  i  nqs
Whol  esal  e grocers
Lumber  & wood  p  roduc  t s
Eati  ng  & drinking places
Cl  eanens
Private househol  ds
Construction
Auto repai  r



























































































using  data from  the 19g0  census  of population  on the industry
location of workers  who  were  born  outside the lJnited  states, spore  Enliistr poorly or not at all,  and  spoke  a language  other than Engriih in tt,e iome.
'computed  as the number  of illega'l alien workers  divided  by the number  of business  establishments. Estimates  of.  illegal  workers  were  obtained  by
multip)ying the figures in column  one  by an estimate  of the total  numb"er  of illegal  aliens_engaged  in nonagriculturil employment  in r9g6.  Data  on number  o business  estab'l  i  shments  were  taken  from  the 19gz  censuses  of u.s. industries.
?
"computed  as the number  of illegai  alien workers  divided by the total  numbe of workers.  Estimates  of total  wori.ers  were  made  by combining  1990  census  data on the industry location of allU.s.  workers  with BLs  data on total  nonfarm emp  l  oyment  in 1986.Tabl  e 2
NUIIERICAL  DATA  FoR  ''t"lEDIUM,' ENFORCEI.4ENT  REGIME
0rn =  .03
0rO  = .06












st  r  tut arametens
oIL = 11.8




.25 n a =  .32
=-1.0Tabl  e 3




Med  i um
(  I.,  n=.49)
l-linh
Percent  Change  In:
Aggregate  o  utp  ut
Real  jliegal  wage
Real  I  ow-sk  i  l1 wage
Reai  hi  gh-ski  1  l wage
I1  l  ega1  l  abor  supply
Effecti ve Tax Rate
(  percent)
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SENSITIVITY  RESULTS  FOR  "MEDIUMII  ENFORCEMENT  REGIIlE
mmtgrant mmi  grants  an
Base Supply  Less
Elaslic
Low-S  k  i  I  I  Workers
Less  Substitutable
Percent  Change  In:
Aggregate  o  utp  ut
Real  il1ega1  wage
Real  l  ow-ski  11  wage
Real  high-ski11  wage
I11ega1  l  abor supply
Employment  of i  l  iegal  s
in enforced  sector
-0.7
-27  .r
3.8
-1.3
-100.0
-0.5
-34.  0
2.8
-1.0
-17.0
-89.5
-u.o
-4J. 
J
.8
-1.1
-23.5
-/a,J